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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
.\LAX D. FRANDSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

I

and ZELDA
1:ERS'I1.NER, his wife.

Defendants and
Third Party PlaintiffsAppellants.

vs.
OL Y MPFS
al tall Corporation,

Oase No. 12134

INC.,

Third-Party Defe11d(f/ltRespo11dcnt.

HEPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Thli Disposition Of Case By Lower Court, Relief
On Appeal and the Statement Of The Facts on
\rhiclt this appeal rests for purposes of this Reply Brief,
cll'l' set forth in the main Brief of the appellants which
; .. 11n file with the Supreme Court.

STAr:I1 EMENT OF PURPOSE

:iiir]

l'l1l' purpose of this Reply Brief is to respond to
Hllfi\rer ePrtain issues discussed by the respondents

2

in their Brief which will be helpful in the disposition of
this matter.
The respondents, in their Brief, discussed a factual
issue concerning a certain telephone call made by tlie
defendant, Gene Gerstner, on June 3, 1969, and a chronology of events on that day to which defendants-appellants herein reply. The effect of failure to properly
subscribe an Earnest .Money Receipt and the prupPr
application of the law when a directed verdict is granted
is also discussed.

Although the Reply Brief of the

appellants is limited to certain issues, all of the argument in the appellants' main Brief is reaffirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO BINDING AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED
INTO FOR THE SALE OF THE MILLCREEK INN
AS

THE

DEFENDANT,

GENE

GERSTNER,

TALKED TO HIS AGENT, JOHN HYDE, ON JUNE
3, 1969, DIRECTING THAT MATERIAL TERMS
DIFFERENT THAN IN THE FRANDSEN OFFER
BE PART OF THE TRANSACTION, AND THIS
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE AGENT
WAS PRIOR TO THE TIME ANY ACTION WAS
PURPORTEDLY TAKEN ON A TELEGRAM

THE GERSTNERS, THUS THERE WAS NO COl\I-

}!UNICATION OF AN UN CONDITION AL ACCEPTANCE TO THE OFFEROR TO FORM A CONTRACT.

A (':lil \ms mad<' by defendant Uene Gerstner to his
ai;1•nt .J olm l 1yde on .June :J, 1%9. During said call,
1:,•n;tnrr made material chang<• in thP offor proposPd
(R
App. B.

11111(·1·111i11g tl1(• ::\1illcreek Inn

ln their Brief, the n'spondents admit nneqni111i'all:» that tlif•n' was surh a call on .June 3 (R<'s. B. p. 5;
111.11 J. l)pfpnclants asfwrt that convincing Pvid<>nre
IHr\\'s tlwt (forstiwr ralled H)·de <'arly on .June 3, 1969,
amnnd I ::W a.rn. California time and after said rall,
lll"d1• tlu,11 rall<>d Frandsen to inform him of what tlu'
n'quir<'d prior to Hyde taking action on a
sunt h)· tlw Gurstners.

I"

:

1

H<•eognizing that the Koepke Sayles & Co. v. Lustig
' 111. <·asf', 283 Pac. 458 (cited in appellants' Brief p.
1m·sPnts an "interesting point of law," the re'/l(IJHl1·nts attempt to skirt this case and the law it
'iipports as extPnsively argued hy defendants that a
'"1111nunieation of an acceptance to the offeror is reil!i11·d L>· stating that Hyd(• alrt•ady act<>d on the pur"11"l1·1l ( ;nstrwr
telegram hY contacting Frandsen
1

'··f'or1• CPrshwr railed (Res. B. p. 10), hut yet the
''J! 0 ndPnt1' go alwad in their Bri<'f to arglw that "the
11 1
1. • rr nl is1'1W in dispute is u·lien thf' defendant tele·n"d lii1' au:<'nt, .Tolin 'f'. Hyde ... " (RPs. B. p. 10-11).
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Thus, admitting a June 3 call and with the telling
mony of Gene Gerstner that he made this call early in
the morning on June 3, 1969, respondents attempt to
dispute the time when Gerstner called.
Because of the discussion by the respondents of
this :factual issue, it is important to analyze the ref'ord
more extensively to thereby show that while the tPsti
mony of Gene Gerstner as to the fact of his early morning call is consistent, the evidence adduced by the nspondents to contradict this is conflicting. On page 11 of
their Brief, respondents argue that the clear
of defendant, Gene Gerstner, about the early morning
call is apparently not evidentiary merely because their
own witness, John Hyde, who seemed to have a proh!P111
on cross-examination remembering the June 3 call,
testified that he (John Hyde) was not in his office until
after 11 :00 a.m. on the morning of June 3, 1969 (see also
Res. Brief p. 4).
Although the respondents only rely on the testimoniof John Hyde as to his arrival at his office on June 3.
a closer reading of the record shows a serious conflict
in the evidence of the respondents in establishing th,,
events of June 3, 1969. The following from the
examination of plaintiff, Alan Frandsen, is enlighteninr

Q. Now, I understand you to have testified that
on the morning of June 3rd, you got a call
from Mr. Hyde of Mt. Olympus Realtyf
A. Yes.

Q. You know about what time?
A. It was in the morning, I'd say aro1ind 10 :00,

o'rlock, 9:30 -10:00.

Q. From Mr. Hyde?
A. Yes.

Q. You've heard Jlr. Hyde testify that he didn't
arrire until about 11 :00 o'clock that morning?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he say where he was calling you from?
A. No.
Q. Rut, did he make a reference to having
received a telegram, did he?
A. I believe he told me more or less conversation
was he says you just - you've purchased
yourself a restaurant. So, I didn't - that
was about the the extent of our conversation.
(Rec. 300-301) (Emphasis added)

At page 4- of l'l'spondents' Brief, it is stated that
after Hyde received the news ·of Gerstner's purportt•d
acceptance after arriving at his (Hyde's) office, thcu
"Hyde telephoned 11..,randsen to inform him that his offo
had been accepted and he had 'purchased himself a
restaurant.' " This is a bald conflict in the evidence of
the respondents. Counsel for the defendants even called
to Frandsen 's attention during this cross-examination
the fact that Hyde testified that he (Hyde) didn't arriw
at his office until after 11 :00 a.m. and yPt Frandsen
testified to receiving a call at least an hour prior to
11 :00 a.m.
·After Gerstner called Hyde on the 3rd, respondenli
further admit in their Statement of Facts that he (Hnlei
then called Frandsen concerning this Gerstner-Hyde call:
"Hyde then telephoned Frandsen and informed him ul
Gerstner's request ... " (Res. Brief p. 5). In their Statement of Facts, respondents go on to admit that with tJii,
teh·phonic change made, that on Ju11e 4, the nPxt
thnt
the telegram was physically received and the
Money Receipt was then signed, yet said Receipt
unchanged from its original terms which both jft.
Olympus and Frandsen knew had been changPd prior tu
this unauthorizPd
(Res. Brief p. 5).
The evidence of respondents in the chronology ul
on

.J mw

3

1s

conflicting-

and

defrnclaut,

submit that at the very least the jury should have hcrn

7

<l<'eide the timing of the calls and the consisti·ntly supported assertion of defendants that Frandsen
infornw<l hy Hyde of a change in terms before the
!i·legram was acted upon thus, there being no binding
As t<::•stified to by Gerstner, he was told by
Jlnlt' on tlw 3rd that Hyde had not yet contacted Frand-

all(llH'd to

: n (R.

400; 427).

At page 11 of their Brief, the respondents make a
1::1:;,-:ing attempt to suggest that the telephone bill, Ex.
D-21, \\'hieh was introduced into evidence by the defendto prove a .June 3rd call, justifies their chornological
11:1>ition. The time of the telephone call on June 3, 1969,
1' not listed on the telephone hill and Alan Bishop,
·,,unst>l for the respondents, even suggested during the
1rial that "it's unfortunate that that particular call, which
lw('fllll<'s of such importance, doesn't have the exact time
!111rn lwre" (R. 429).
1

\\'ith rPspeet to the chronological order of the
:,.[,·phone ealls, after Mr. Bishop had examined the

'H1'1Hlant, Gene Gerstner, concerning it, with it being
111

int(•d out that all telephone calls are not listed in

111

,,.

1"

1

1!ll(llogical onfor as to time and that all calls don't
ll

liav(• a time listed such as this particular person-to-

1·'011

rall, the following was asked of defendant

' "l':<IJH·1·

on eross-examination:

8

Q. Isn't it true that this Exhibit shows that 011
the 2nd of June, you placed a call at 9 :30 and
then one at at 10 :33 and, then, one at
that there is no particular chronological _
it shows a 9 :30 and then 10 :33 and then 32.
Also, doesn't it show that on the 7th of Jww,
you placed a call, which is listed first a lU,
and then they list the next one at 10 :07.
(Exhibit D-21 shows calls on June 7, 1969 ai
10 :10 a.m. listed first and then 10 :07) (Insert
added)

A. On the same day.
Q. On the same day, isn't that true?

A. Yes.
Q. And with respect to the call, which hlr
Bishop has said was so crucial, there's n11
time listed at all, is there?

A. No.
Q. And on the other exhibits, the telephone call'
are similar examples, are they

A. Yes. (R. 430-431)
Exhibit 48-D shows a call listed on 3/14 at 9 :09 p.lll
first and then the next one at 6 :30 p.m.
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n•view of the telephone bill exhibits indicate that
calls do not have times listed. The
themselves in their Brief at page 11 admit
that all long- distance telephone calls are not listed upon
tltt·

telephone bill in chronological order and, thus, there

n(l

evidentiary validity to the assertion that the bill

,uli,tantiates a phone call at a different time than one
,·ar!Y in the morning as tesified to h.v Gent' Gerstner.
POINT II
THERE IS NO BINDING CONTRACT EVEN IF

.JOII:t\ HYDE HAD CALLED ALAN FRANDSEN
PRTOR TO RECEIVING A TELEPHONE CALL FROM

DEFENDANT GENE GERSTNER BECAUSE THE
R\RNEST r.lONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT PROPERLY
!Til:.'·CRIBED.

TliP n'spondents atfrmpt to distinguish the J( oepkP

supra, by· stating that in the case at bar, that the
:ir·rpptance had been communicated when John Hyde
111posedly called Alan Frandsen to tell him "more or

1

that he had bought a restaurant. En"n a:,;snrning
faets of the respondents, arguendo only, and dis"1ntin;!: tli0 discrepancy in respondents' evidence there
111 ilrl
he no binding agreement under fundamental
·1:11 :H·t Ja \\'.
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·without confusing this with the Statute of Fraud,,
or the necessity of other more formal documents to be
signed, arguments in the main Brief of the appellants, it
is contractu.aUy required by the Earnest Money Ri·r·eipt
and Offer to Purchase (Ex. P-G) that tlw "offer is mad,,
suh,ject to the written accevtance of the seller endorser/
hereon . . . " Respondents attempt to discount this rn
their Brief (beginning at page 20) by citing somr casP,,
and arguing tlwrPfrom that where parties have agn·ed
on terms, it is not n<'cessary for purposes of
the parties to execut("' a more formal contract later. Tht'it'
cases, and argument, however, are not applicable to tllf'
present situation.
The garnest Money Ht-'ceipt signed by Frandsl'n j,
a conditional offer with a contractual prorision that tl11
only way an acceptance may be manifested is by tl)i'
way required in the offer of the offeror, tlw Earneit
Money Receipt. There is absolutely no acceptanre l'\'t'!!
if, arguendo only, assent is manifest in sonw other wa1
This is to be distinguished from a situation where partiei
come to terms where the offer itself does not stipulat 1•
a method of acceptance as in the Earnest Money R<>('e:pt.
To arrive at anotli<>r ronclusion ·would emasculate th,·
right of an offeror to require acceptance in a spP('ifad
manner.
TltP respondents fnrthPr aclmit that the Earni·it
. d f o]' •!11•
:;\Ioney Rece1. pt was not eYen purpo rte dl y s1g1w
'·

11

on .June :3, but rather the next day on June 4,
JiJli9, after the respondents had knowledge by their own
:tiluiission that the terms were different than in the
Money Receipt. The respondents also failed to
.-liuw any power of attorney for .1\!It. Olympus to perform
this ad of execution on the 4th of June. It is extensively
ir"lll'd in the Brief of the appellants that this was an act
' ....
1, ithont any authority whatsoever on the part of Mt.
1il>111p11s Realty. Without mPeting the requirements of
1i1P
Ueceipt, the def(indants resp<>ctfnlly
-11'1mit that as a matter of law they are Pntitled to a
din·ded verdict, that no binding agreement ever existed
a11d at tlw very l('ast that there was strong and convincing
'1·i1kn('e to he considered by the jury.
POINT III
DIRECTED

VERDICTS

GRANTED

BY

THE

TRIAL COURT WERE NOT PROPER.

The la"· in Utah provides that all evidence and conl1uy1•rkd facts should he found in favor of the party
a:;ainst whurn u vPrdict is directed. Consideration as to

lidher evidence is pr<>sPnt<"d on material points for jury
" n:-;idrrntion is to be made after ('YidPnce is constrnf'd in
Tor of the party against whom a ve1dict is direeted as
'qiportrd by Utah case law. After considering
1
'''"1itrd by the defendants, there is no question but that
\la:- c·onsistent and convincing evidence presented
11
ull matNial issnes in this matter for jury considera11

11

"'"

1:2

This is to be distinguished from situations wherein u
party fails to present any e\-idence on a mah•rial
or evidence so far removed from a material il'sllf: thar
it is the same as presenting no evidence. Respondenb
suggest in their Brief at pages 7-8 that all rnatPrialpoint,
were not controverted, yet respondents fail to prorid,
examples of such in their Brief. In fact, as pointed om,
respondents discuss factual points "\vhen_•in their 111111
(•vidence is conflicting.
CONCLUSION
Defendants sugmit that strong and clear eviden1·1·
was presented on all material issues in the trial cour:
proceedings sufficient for jury consideration. fJ. here a11·
serious conflicts in evidence produced by the respond1·nl,
In light of the improperly subscribed Earnest Mon".i
Receipt, the law of directed verdicts and issues raised u1
their main Brief, defendants ask for the relil•f souglrr
in their main Brief, including as a matter of law that 11
binding agreement ever came into existence.
1

1

'

Respectfully submitted,

J. THOMAS GREENE and
GIFFORD '\\T. PRICE
'Cannon Greene & Nelwl1w
'
400 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8.fl 11
Attorneys for A;1pcllo11I-

